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In this paper, transport intensity concerns the economic or energy efficiency of transport. 
The focus of the paper is the measurement and use of indicators of transport intensity. Most 
research has concentrated on the volume and distance measures, which show continuous 
increases over time, normally at a rate that is higher than the growth in Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). It is argued that an additional element needs to be included, namely 
transport efficiency, which relates to modes, technologies, organisational structures, the use 
of resources and prices. The measurement of GDP also needs to be extended. Measures of 
economic and transport energy efficiency are applied to EU countries and contrasted with 
similar measures for the USA and Canada. The empirical evidence is then placed in the 
wider context of globalisation and economic change, and the case for real decoupling is 
made for both the freight and passenger sectors. 
1. Introduction 
Historically, there has been a close relationship between the growth in freight and passenger 
transport and economic growth, at least as measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The 
question raised here is related to the underlying rationale for this statistical relationship and 
whether the relationship will (or should) continue into the future. Our conclusion in this 
paper is that there is no reason why transport growth needs to follow economic growth. 
Indeed, there are strong efficiency and environmental arguments for breaking the link. What 
is required are policies that contribute to reducing the transport intensity of activities whilst at 
the same time maintaining economic growth – this is the decoupling argument. 
Travel can be broken down into three component parts: volume, distance and efficiency. The 
first two components are usually combined to give measures of performance (i.e. passenger-
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kilometres or tonne-kilometres), but the third element is equally important as it relates to 
modes, travel time and price, the use of resources, technology and organisational factors. For 
example, in the freight sector, efficiency can be increased through the use of logistics, flat 
organisational structures and new forms of handling. Such measures can increase efficiency, 
and reduce the volumes and distances travelled. However, they can also work to increase the 
volumes/distances travelled. The latter needs to be avoided if decoupling is to occur. 
The rest of this paper is divided into five main parts. In the first part we present some of the 
available evidence on transport intensity as it relates to GDP from the US and the EU. Apart 
from helping to understand what has happened over the recent past, the evidence helps 
illustrate the key elements in the relationships between transport growth and economic 
activity. Of particular importance here are the measures of transport intensity used, GDP and 
the implicit assumptions built into the forecasts. The second part of the paper explores some 
alternative ways in which transport intensity can be measured, principally through common 
measures of mass movement and the addition of the efficiency element to measures of 
transport intensity. Alternative approaches to the use of GDP are also addressed, but here 
quality of data is a limiting factor. In the third part of the paper we focus on some qualitative 
data concerning transport intensity within European countries (as opposed to the EU as a 
whole outlined in the second part of the paper). We broaden the discussion in the fourth part 
of the paper to explore changes that are already taking place at a more detailed level in 
individual countries and in the economy more generally, which both have important 
implications for the intensity of transport. We present our conclusions in the fifth and final 
part of the paper. 
2. Transport Intensity – Definitions and Relationships 
Two distinct types of measures of transport intensity are commonly used: (i) measures of 
transport energy efficiency (TEC) and (ii) measures of transport-related economic efficiency 
(relative to transport volumes). The first category of measures is defined according to energy 
consumption as a ratio of passenger movements, freight movements or a combination of both 
(using the concepts of net mass movement and gross mass movement, discussed in more 
detail by Peake, 1994 and Stead, 2001). Authors such as Scholl et al (1996) and Michaelis 
and Davidson (1996) use this type of measure when referring to transport intensity. The 
second category of transport intensity measures are defined according to economic activity as 
a ratio of passenger movements, freight movements or a combination of both (again using the 
concepts of net mass movement and gross mass movement). SACTRA (1999) use this type of 
measure when referring to transport intensity. One of the commonly used and most widely 
available measures of economic activity, GDP, provides a way of comparing economic 
activity in different countries. However, it is recognised that this measure has a number of 
limitations when considering issues of welfare or sustainability (see Section 3). 
The concepts of decoupling and transport intensity are perhaps of more concern in Europe 
than in North America (Gilbert and Nadeau, 2002). In a narrow sense, decoupling is arguably 
already taking place in the US freight sector: the tonne-kilometres carried have increased at a 
rate substantially below the growth in GDP (Figure 1). This trend is both true for the last 
forty years (since 1960) and for the more recent past (since 1985). A comparison between the 
US and the EU is informative, as there seems to be a convergence between the curves for 
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passenger-kilometres per unit of GDP. This convergence is despite substantial differences 
between the two continents in terms of car ownership levels (EU = 532 vehicles per 1000 
population in 1999; US = 800 vehicles per 1000 population in 1999) and in terms on land 
area (EU = 3.24 million km2; US = 9.36 million km2). The clear difference between the 
freight curves indicates the longer distances travelled in the US, but even here there is a 
narrowing of the gap. This may relate to space but also to economic restructuring that is 
taking place in both economies. At one level these comparisons suggest that the EU should 
be more concerned about decoupling than the US, partly because the EU levels of transport 
intensity are as high as those in the US for passenger travel but also because both the 
passenger and freight curves are rising in the EU. 
There are some striking differences between the recent trends in passenger and freight 
transport and economic activity in the EU and the US (Tables 1 and 2). Between 1985 and 
1998, there were similar increases in passenger-kilometres travelled in the EU and the US 
(45% and 40% respectively) but different increases in freight transport (54% and 26% 
respectively). GDP grew at a faster rate in the US than in the EU during this period (49% in 
the US and 35% in the EU). Gilbert and Nadeau (2002) suggest that declining transport 
intensities in the US and rising levels in the EU may result from the stage of economic 
development as transport intensity may at first rise with increasing real GDP and then fall. 
They further examine this proposition through plotting the transport intensity (passenger-
kilometres per unit GDP) for 61 urban regions with populations over one million against 
GDP per capita. According to their research, ‘a uniform decline in passenger transport 
intensity with increases in GDP for urban regions in developing and developed countries, 
other than those in North America and Australia’ (Gilbert and Nadeau, 2002). In the US and 
Australia, transport intensity is much greater than in urban regions with comparable GDP and 
the values do not decline with increasing regional GDP. Gilbert and Nadeau’s conclusion is 
that GDP differences do not explain the differences in transport intensity at the regional level, 
and that the structural development of the economy may help explain the differences. 
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Source: Gilbert and Nadeau (2002: Figure 4). 
Note: GDP has been adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
Figure 1 Transport Intensities in the US and the EU between 1985 and 1998 
Table 1. Trends in Passenger, Freight and Economic Activity in the EU and the US 
between 1985 and 1998 
 1985 1998 Increase 
US Passenger-kilometres (billions) 
EU Passenger-kilometres (billions) 
  Ratio US/EU 
4,920 
3,316 
1.48 
6,870 
4,808 
1.43 
40% 
45% 
US Freight-kilometres (billions) 
EU Freight-kilometres (billions) 
  Ratio US/EU 
4,305 
1,859 
2.32 
5,417 
2,863 
1.89 
26% 
54% 
US GDP (billions of 1996 US$) 
EU GDP (billions of 1996 US$, PPP) 
  Ratio US/EU 
5,717 
4,369 
1.31 
8,509 
5,899 
1.44 
49% 
35% 
Source: Gilbert and Nadeau (2002, Table 1). 
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Table 2. US and EU Comparative Statistics for 1998 
 US EU Difference  
Population (million) 
Passenger-kilometres per capita 
Tonne-kilometres per capita 
GDP per capita (adjusted for PPP in 1996 US$) 
270 
24,445 
20,060 
$31,515 
375 
12,825 
7,635 
$15,730 
US     -28% 
US    +91% 
US  +163% 
US  +100% 
Source: Based on Gilbert and Nadeau (2002). 
 
The recent EU White Paper on Transport Policy identifies decoupling as a key issue (CEC, 
2001a). However, it is really only a secondary objective of the document, in contrast to the 
European Commission’s Sustainable Development Strategy, in which decoupling transport 
growth and economic growth is the top headline objective for transport (CEC 2001b). The 
White Paper recognises that transport energy consumption is increasing and that 28% of CO2 
emissions are now transport related (CEC, 2001a: p10). In 1990, 739 million tonnes of CO2 
were released from the transport sector, rising to 900 million tonnes in 2000. Further 
substantial increases are expected in the next decade (1113 million tonnes by 2010). Road 
transport accounts for 84% of the 2000 figure, and the total will increase substantially with 
the enlargement of the EU, even though the levels of motorisation in the accession states is 
lower. Nevertheless, the White Paper is optimistic and three types of policy options are 
described (p11 and annex) to reduce transport emissions. The three options comprise: (i) 
pricing (Option A); (ii) pricing and efficiency increases (Option B); and (iii) pricing, 
promotion of alternative modes and targeted investment in the Trans European Networks 
(Option C). The recommendations of the White Paper build on Option C where the market 
share for the individual modes returns to the 1998 levels in 2010 as a result of the measures 
set out in the document. According to the White Paper, ‘by implementing the 60-odd 
measures set out in the White Paper there will be a marked break in the link between 
transport growth and economic growth, although without there being any need to restrict the 
mobility of people and goods’ (CEC, 2001a p11). A summary of the main measures proposed 
by the White Paper is presented in Table 3. 
In their analysis of alternative futures, the EU presents their three options against the trend-
based future (1998-2010). As can be seen from Table 4, the total passenger-kilometres and 
tonne-kilometres do not change as compared with the trend, but there are reductions in the 
vehicle-kilometres for both passenger and freight transport as the impact of pricing, greater 
efficiency and the other measures take effect. So the transport intensity as conventionally 
measured is expected to fall over this period. GDP is assumed to increase by 3% per annum 
(+43% over the 12 year period), whilst trends in passenger-kilometres and tonne-kilometres 
increase by 24% and 38% respectively (Table 5). Transport intensity reduces by 13% for 
passenger travel and 10% for freight transport. This is where circularity is introduced as the 
scale of reduction is based on the assumed increase in GDP, which in turn influences the 
expected growth in passenger and freight travel. Provided that GDP increases at a higher rate 
than travel, transport intensity will of course fall. 
166  

 
(	 	 '#	 	 	!		 	 (#	 	 2	 		
9!	1	
	 +	
Passengers’ rights Changes to air passenger rights including compensation for air travel delays and denied 
boarding due to overbooking. Extension of passenger protection measures to other modes 
such as rail and water transport. 
Road safety Proposals concerning the signposting of accident blackspots, combating excessively long 
driving times, harmonising road transport penalties at the European level and increasing the 
use of new technologies in transport. 
Congestion A new programme (the Marco Polo Programme) to support intermodal initiatives and 
alternatives to road transport in the early stages until they become commercially viable. 
Sustainable mobility Measures to develop fair infrastructure charging which takes into account external costs and 
encourages the use of the least polluting modes of transport. 
Harmonised taxation Proposals for harmonising taxes on diesel for commercial use to reduce distortions of 
competition in the liberalised road transport market. 
Transport services Proposals for harmonising working conditions, especially in road transport, to promote 
safety and improve transport service quality. Actions to encourage good practice in the 
provision of high quality urban transport services. 
Infrastructure Completion of ‘missing links’, particularly the trans-European high-speed passenger rail 
network and infrastructure with genuine potential for transferring goods from road to rail. 
Radionavigation Proposals for a European radionavigation system with potential applications for transport 
(location and measurement of vehicle speed) as well as telecommunications, medicine 
(telemedicine), law enforcement (electronic tagging) and agriculture (geographical 
information systems). 
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Passenger: 
Passenger km (billions) 
Vehicle km (billions) 
CO2 (million tonnes) 
 
4772 
2250 
518.6 
 
5929 
2767 
593.1 
 
5929 
2518 
551.9 
 
5929 
2516 
539.1 
 
5929 
2470 
523.8 
Freight: 
Freight km (billions) 
Vehicle km (billions) 
CO2 (million tonnes) 
 
2870 
316 
300.9 
 
3971 
472.8 
445.4 
 
3971 
430 
408.5 
 
3971 
430 
405.1 
 
3971 
397 
378.6 
Total: 
Vehicle km (billions) 
CO2 (million tonnes) 
 
2566 
819.5 
 
3240 
1038.5 
 
2948 
960.4 
 
2946 
944.2 
 
2867 
902.4 
Based on CEC (2001a: Table 3 of the Annex). 
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GDP ( 8,000 11,400 +43% 
Passenger-kilometres 
Tonne-kilometres 
4,772 
2,870 
5,929 
3,971 
+24% 
+38% 
Transport Intensity: 
 Passenger (pass-km/GDP) 
 Freight (freight-km/GDP) 
 
0.5965 
0.3888 
 
0.5198 
0.3481 
 
-13% 
-10% 
Based on CEC (2001a). 
 
Of more interest in the EU policy options is the reduction of vehicle kilometres (both 
passenger and freight) and the subsequent reductions in CO2 emissions. The policy 
instruments proposed in the White Paper are primarily aimed at making more efficient use of 
the vehicle fleet by raising occupancy levels in all modes, by reducing vehicle-kilometres and 
by encouraging modal shift (Option C). The impact is less apparent in the passenger sector (-
10%) than in the freight sector (-16%) but this balance is redressed when the changes in CO2 
emissions are viewed, where there are about 10% reductions in both sectors. The 
improvement in CO2 emissions relates to expected gains in vehicle efficiency from the 
voluntary agreements with the car industry. It should also be noted that all these reductions 
are taken against the trend, not the 1998 levels. In each option for 2010 there is a substantial 
increase in travel and CO2 emissions as compared with 1998 levels. 
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Car passenger-
kilometres 
Declining positive: 
+1.6% to 0.2%. 
Car traffic growth > 
GDP growth. 
Constant variable: 
+0.4%. 
Car traffic growth > 
GDP growth. 
Constant variable: 
+0.5%. 
Car traffic growth > 
GDP growth. 
Constant negative: 
-0.1%. 
Car traffic growth < 
GDP growth. 
HGV tonne-
kilometres 
Variable negative: 
-0.4% to –0.1%. 
HGV traffic growth < 
GDP growth. 
Variable negative: 
-0.3% to –0.1%. 
HGV traffic growth < 
GDP growth. 
Variable positive: 
+0.1% to +0.5%. 
HGV traffic growth > 
GDP growth. 
Increasing negative: 
0.0% to –0.3%. 
HGV traffic growth < 
GDP growth. 
LGV tonne-
kilometres 
Variable: 
-0.4% to +0.2%. 
LGV traffic growth < 
GDP growth. 
Volatile. Volatile positive: 
+0.2% to +1.0% 
LGV traffic growth > 
GDP growth. 
No Forecast. 
Based on evidence cited in SACTRA (1999). 
Notes: 
1.  Positive means that traffic growth is higher than GDP growth and negative means that traffic growth is less 
than GDP growth 
2. HGV = heavy goods vehicles > 3.5 tonnes gross unladen weight 
3.  LGV = light goods vehicle < 3.5 tonnes gross unladen weight 
 
The influential Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment (SACTRA) report, 
which was primarily concerned with understanding the link between transport and the 
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economy in the UK, also examined transport intensity. It reported a strong positive 
correlation between GDP growth and traffic growth, with the intensity of car and light goods 
vehicle traffic (LGVs) increasing but that of Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGVs) decreasing. 
These changes were plotted as 5-year moving averages of the percentage difference between 
GDP change and traffic change: the main conclusions from this analysis are summarised in 
Table 6. 
There is considerable variability between modes and at different points of time, both in terms 
of size and direction of the difference. However, recent evidence (between 1985 and 1995) 
shows that all types of traffic (car, HGV and LGV) have grown at a faster rate than GDP. For 
car traffic, this pattern can be traced back much further. It is not just in the UK that this is 
occurring. The SACTRA report also reviewed similar evidence on car and freight traffic 
(1970-1994) from France, Sweden, the Netherlands and Italy. In all cases, car traffic growth 
was substantially higher than GDP growth. The case for freight transport is on the other hand 
less clear. There were also substantial differences between the national figures, and within 
individual countries over time, suggesting that different factors were influencing the 
relationship between traffic growth and GDP growth. From the perspective of reducing the 
transport intensity of the economy, the picture is bleak. As traffic growth is substantially 
higher that GDP growth, this means that some ‘flip process’ is required to get the traffic 
growth curve below the GDP curve. Forecasts suggest that this will take place (Table 5) but 
there seems to be a flaw in the argument here. As the SACTRA report points out, there is a 
clear reasoning why transport intensity should decrease over time as the traffic forecasts are 
driven by growth in car ownership, not by distance travelled per vehicle (SACTRA 1999, 
p295). Car ownership forecasts in turn are determined by income, which itself is assumed to 
be linked to GDP growth (assumed to rise by 3% per annum). The relationship between car 
ownership and income is assumed to lead to eventual saturation. These three factors together 
mean that intensity will decline in the future. The SACTRA report concludes that the 
difference between ‘periods of increasing and reducing intensity will be indications of the 
maturity of the car ownership growth curve rather than the success or otherwise of policies 
intended to influence traffic growth’ (SACTRA, 1999: p296). The implications of this are 
potentially profound: 
1. The intensity of car traffic should fall with time as the elasticity of traffic with respect to 
income falls. However, this has not yet happened. Transport intensity grows when the 
elasticity of traffic with respect to income is greater than one and declines when the 
elasticity is less than one. The cross sectional evidence suggests that there are substantial 
differences in car use, which are not related to either car ownership or income (SACTRA, 
1999: p297). This intriguing statement is not developed further in the report. 
2. There is circularity in the use of this approach to the measurement of transport intensity 
as car ownership, income and GDP are closely related in forecasting travel demand. GDP 
growth is often assumed given and this determines income growth and car ownership 
growth, which in turn are used to forecast increases in traffic. Such a close relationship 
means that it is difficult to unravel what is causing change. It seems that car use must be 
separated from car ownership and that other factors (such as pricing, regulation and 
technology) should all be influences in the use of the car. 
3. GDP may also be too limiting a variable if the intention is to reduce transport intensity. 
Other measures of the economy could be used (Section 3). 
More generally, there are other important implications: 
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More generally, there are other important implications: 
Income may become less important than other factors in driving the growth in travel. Car 
ownership is now relatively cheap compared with income levels and it is not a real 
constraint. In some cases, however, car use has become more expensive over time (in the 
UK for example) as the costs of fuel and tax/insurance have all risen at a substantially 
higher rate than the cost of ownership (Table 7).1 A clearer understanding is required for 
the motivations of car use apart from the costs. This could be a fruitful area of research in 
different national settings. 
The figures used throughout reflect national travel patterns, not the growth in the longer 
distance and international travel markets. These two sectors are both growing 
substantially and further increases are expected in the future. They cannot be ignored and 
raise the additional question whether GDP measured on a national basis is appropriate for 
international travel changes. 
As noted above, the car traffic figures (and those for LGV) are above the GDP levels, so 
the transport intensity is increasing. However, there are still expectations (apart from the 
logic of the SACTRA saturation argument noted above) that there will be a reversal. 
Income growth is clearly very important in determining traffic levels but other policy 
interventions (such as price, speed and quality of transport) must also have a key role to 
play in curbing traffic growth. In the past, these interventions do not seem to have been 
particularly successful in achieving that aim, yet both the EU and SACTRA are optimistic 
that this can be achieved, particularly if prices are set at marginal social cost levels. 
The presentation of the data can be misleading in that transport intensity can decrease (if 
GDP growth is greater than traffic growth) even if traffic growth is increasing. From the 
perspective of sustainable development, this is not desirable. Sustainable development 
requires a net reduction in the environmental impact of transport as measured by 
emissions and the use of non-renewable resources. The headline figures from the new US 
statement that ‘an aggressive strategy to cut greenhouse gas intensity by 18% over the 
next ten years’ oversimplifies the challenge (The Economist, 2002: p49). There is no 
reduction in emissions even proposed in this statement, only the levels of emissions per 
unit of economic output: it is merely a continuation of the established pattern of change in 
the US (Gilbert and Nadeau, 2002). 
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2676.2666	
Retail Price Index 
Car 
 Purchase 
 Fuel 
 Maintenance 
 Tax and insurance 
Bus 
Rail 
+43 
+53 
+16 
+93 
+74 
+85 
+65 
+72 
Source: Banister (2002) 
                                                 
1
 Between 1989 and 1999, the cost of public transport (bus and rail) in the UK increased at a faster rate than the 
costs of car travel. 
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3. Alternative Measures of Transport Intensity 
In reviewing alternative measures for presenting transport intensity and decoupling, it seems 
that further fundamental thinking is required. In his research on the similarities between the 
energy sector and the transport sector, Peake (1994) made two important contributions. One 
was to place passenger and freight movement on a common basis (tonne-kilometre equivalent 
– tkme) by developing the concept of mass movement. This means that each passenger is 
given a gross weight (made up of their own weight and their luggage), so that passenger-
kilometres can be converted to tonne-kilometres. The second was to develop the notions of 
gross mass movement (GMM) to capture all transport movements in the economy and net 
mass movement (NMM) to capture the useful elements of activity. From these aggregate 
measures, indicators of gross transport intensity (GTI) and net transport intensity (NTI) can 
be obtained through linking them to GDP change. The GMM/GDP ratio is a proxy for 
transport efficiency (Peake, 1994: p69), and NMM/GDP is a measure of ‘useful’ transport 
activity. Peake found that the NMM/GMM ratio was falling over time (1952-1992) in the UK 
and that the mass productivity of transport was declining by some 20%. On the other hand, 
NTI was constant over time (0.7 tkme per £1 of GDP), whilst GTI was increasing, 
particularly after 1973, from 2.6 tkme per unit GDP in 1973 to 3.1 tkme per unit GDP in 
1992 – an increase of 19%. 
Peake concludes that transport intensity is becoming less sustainable, and that 77% of mass 
movement in 1992 was due to the incidental movement of carriers, rather than the real 
movement of people and freight (Peake, 1994: p73). In all of this analysis, the freight sector 
dominated, as it accounted for 86% of the NMM, and the huge increase in the unladen weight 
of HGVs (a 4-fold increase 1952-1992) added to this dominance. The ‘average weight’ of the 
passenger was set at 50 kilogrammes seems rather low, although a doubling of this figure this 
would probably not affect the results significantly. Peake also found measurement and data 
problems that may have limited the accuracy of his results, but his work does begin to include 
efficiency variables in the analysis of transport intensity. 
This thinking has been further developed by the current authors (Banister et al, 2000; Stead, 
2001) and by others (e.g. Scholl et al, 1996; Schipper and Marie-Lilliu, 1999). Measures of 
transport energy efficiency have been developed that enhance the traditional measures of 
transport intensity. They can also be used to address the issue of emissions and the use of 
resources. In this way it is possible not only to view the transport implications but also the 
environmental impacts of adopting particular policy packages. In addition, primary energy 
consumption can be converted into emissions levels for the key pollutants (including CO2) 
through analysis of the carbon content of the different fuels used. As transport is almost 
entirely sourced from oil, this is relatively simple to calculate, even over a ten year period 
where alternative fuels might be increasingly used (Hoogma et al, 2002). This approach is 
similar to the development of the ASIF equation by Schipper and Marie-Lilliu (1999) in 
which emissions are related to the total travel activity, the energy efficiency and the fuel type 
for each mode. Most of the components related to transport and the environment are 
encapsulated in this simple equation and the impacts of the different policy alternatives can 
be tested, together with their feedback components. As Schipper (2001) states, ‘the key 
purpose of ASIF identity is to show policy makers how the components of transport and 
emissions fit together, and make sure that the potential – and actual – impacts of their 
actions on each component are noted… It helps remind analysts of some of the linkages’. 
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A further issue in measuring transport intensity is the usefulness of GDP as the most 
appropriate measure of economic activity. GDP provides a way of comparing economic 
activity in different countries but has a number of limitations when considering issues of 
welfare or sustainability, since the calculation of GDP includes spending on actions such as 
pollution clean-up and medical treatment for road accident victims (for more detail, refer to 
Anderson, 1991; Jackson and Marks, 1994; Cobb et al, 1999). In addition, GDP does not take 
account of unpaid household production (such as caring, preparing meals, education and 
housework), even though this supplies services to the economy. There are also a number of 
other problems with using GDP to measure and compare economic activity, each of which 
make long-term analysis of GDP trends difficult: 
1. GDP figures do not show how economic activity is distributed across society (the 
Genuine Progress Indicator attempts address this – see below) 
2. Exchange rate fluctuations and cost of living differences in different countries make 
comparisons of GDP trends between countries problematic 
3. GDP does not take account of unpaid activities, including many household activities 
(such as caring, preparing meals, education and housework), even though these are 
services to the economy 
Hanley et al (1999) identify a number of alternative measures of economic activity such as 
Net National Product, genuine savings, net primary productivity, the Index of Sustainable 
Economic Welfare (ISEW) and the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI). For example, the GPI 
corrects some of the anomalies in the formulation of GDP and shows that in the US, GPI rose 
by 23% per capita (between 1950 and 1998) as compared with the 164% increase in GDP. 
Apart from addressing some of the limitations of the GDP measure, GPI explicitly includes 
income inequality and people’s perceptions of progress (or lack of it). The team producing it 
(Cobb et al, 1999) also claim that the focus on GDP encourages short term benefits rather 
than longer term costs in terms of debt and loss of resources. Stead (2001) compares trends in 
transport efficiency in the UK between 1975 and 1990 relative to both GDP and ISEW and 
shows that there is a big difference between the two. 
4. Empirical Evidence from EU Countries 
A substantial amount of empirical evidence has already been cited at the aggregate level 
(Section 2). Here the focus is more on the variations within EU countries and how these have 
changed over time. We present data for individual EU countries on transport energy 
efficiency and transport economic efficiency by passenger-kilometre, tonne-kilometre and 
Net Mass Movement. 
Transport intensity trends across individual European countries show a substantial amount of 
diversity from the trends for Europe as a whole (Stead, 2001). Most of the 15 EU countries 
have experienced quite individual trends in transport intensity between 1970 and 1995 (Table 
7) and few common patterns in transport intensity trends between 1970 and 1995 are obvious. 
SACTRA (1999) observe that ‘traffic intensity, however measured, shows very considerable 
variation from country to country’. Some indicators of transport intensity used here (such as 
transport energy consumption per passenger-kilometre or GDP per tonne-kilometre) show 
improvements in the majority of EU Member States between 1970 and 1995, whilst other 
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indicators (such as transport energy consumption per tonne-kilometre or GDP per unit of 
transport energy consumption) show worsening trends in transport intensity in most EU 
countries. 
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Austria  = =  = = = 
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Denmark       = 
Finland =   =   = 
France =       
Germany =   n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Greece     =   
Ireland    =    
Italy        
Luxembourg        
Netherlands =       
Portugal      =  
Spain  = =     
Sweden   =  = = = 
UK =   = = = = 
EU =    = =  
Source: Stead (2001). 
Notes: 
 denotes an improvement in transport intensity of more than 10 per cent between 1970 and 19952 
 = denotes no large increase or decrease in transport intensity (less than 10 per cent change 
between 1970 and 1995) 
 denotes a deterioration in transport intensity of more than 10 per cent between 1970 and 19953 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
TEC Transport Energy Consumption 
 
The trends in the seven measures of transport intensity for each country often do not follow 
the same direction – some indicators suggest that transport intensity is increasing whilst 
others suggest the reverse. No country in the EU can claim substantial improvements in  
transport intensity between 1970 and 1995 across all seven indicators. On the other hand, no 
country in the EU experienced substantial reductions in transport intensity between 1970 and 
                                                 
2
.  An improvement in transport intensity means either: 
 a. a decrease in the energy efficiency value (i.e. less energy used per unit of transport movement or per unit 
of transport energy consumption); or 
 b. an increase in the economic efficiency value (i.e. more economic activity per unit of transport movement 
or per unit of transport energy consumption). 
3.
  A deterioration in transport intensity means either: 
 a. an increase in the energy efficiency value (i.e. more energy used per unit of transport movement or per unit 
of transport energy consumption); or 
 b. a decrease in the economic efficiency value (i.e. less economic activity per unit of transport movement or 
per unit of transport energy consumption). 
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1995 across all seven indicators. There is a certain amount of evidence for the decoupling of 
economic activity and transport volumes between 1970 and 1995 in some countries (such as 
Finland and Ireland) although transport energy efficiency decreased over the same period in 
these countries, according to at least some indicators. On the other hand, measures of 
economic efficiency suggest some evidence of worsening trends in countries such as 
Belgium, Denmark and Spain. Only Italy experienced an improvement in  
 according to the three indicators. Luxembourg was the only country to experience a 
decline in    according to the three indicators used here. Across 
Europe as a whole, the indicators tend to suggest that transport intensity became less efficient 
between 1970 and 1995. This corresponds with Peake’s observation that transport intensity 
has become less and less efficient over the last 40 years (Peake, 1994). 
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Austria =    =   
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Finland =       
France =   =  =  
Germany =   n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Greece =    =   
Ireland       = 
Italy  =  = =   
Luxembourg        
Netherlands = =   =   
Portugal   =  =   
Spain    =    
Sweden =    =   
UK =   =    
Source: Stead (2001). 
Notes: 
 denotes lower transport intensity than the European average by more than 10 per cent4 
 = denotes similar efficiency to the European average (within 10 per cent of the European average) 
 denotes higher transport intensity than the European average by over 10 per cent5 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
TEC Transport Energy Consumption 
 
Comparing the most recent measures of transport intensity (1995 values) with the European 
average, few common patterns are obvious here either (Table 9). For many countries, some 
                                                 
4
 Lower transport intensity means either: 
 a. less energy used per unit of transport movement or per unit of transport energy consumption; or 
 b. more economic activity per unit of transport movement or per unit of transport energy consumption. 
5
. Higher transport intensity means either: 
 a. more energy used per unit of transport movement or per unit of transport energy consumption; or 
 b. less economic activity per unit of transport movement or per unit of transport energy consumption. 
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indicators suggest that transport intensity is more efficient whilst others suggest the reverse. 
No country in the EU can claim to be substantially more efficient than the EU average across 
all seven indicators of transport intensity but no country is less efficient than the EU average 
across all seven indicators. This corresponds with SACTRA’s observation that ‘ no 
overwhelming evidence that ‘efficient’ countries are consistently marked by high, low, 
increasing or decreasing levels of transport intensity’ (SACTRA, 1999: p304). 
The conclusion from this analysis is variability both over time (between 1970 and 1995) and 
at a single point in time (1995). Different EU countries have followed different paths and are 
at different stages in terms of economic and social development. The measures of transport 
intensity for individual countries are dependent on economic trends as well as travel trends 
and overall transport demand (influenced by topography, geography, size, land use 
characteristics, socio-economic factors, transport infrastructure and so on). This variability of 
transport intensity indicators across European Member States also reflects the crudeness of 
the measures used and the limitations of the available data. The variability is an issue, which 
has been noted elsewhere (such as SACTRA 1999). Some forecasts assume that transport 
intensity will reduce over time (even though past trends show continuous increases in 
transport intensity), believing that vehicle saturation may lead to improvements in transport 
intensity (see for example SACTRA, 1999). 
The economic structure of individual countries and their geography also influence the 
variability of transport intensity indicators across European Member States. Countries such as 
Belgium or the Netherlands contain a number of large freight distribution companies with 
operations across Europe, which perform transport functions for neighbouring countries. It is 
therefore unsurprising that freight transport movement per capita is higher in these countries 
than the European average. It is likely that some of the freight movements counted for 
countries such as Belgium or the Netherlands neither originate from, nor are destined for, that 
country but are in transit to/from other countries (and, as such, these figures do not perfectly 
represent the transport intensity of a country). In countries that have experienced very marked 
economic growth (such as Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal), indicators of transport 
intensity have often changed substantially, although not always in the same direction. 
8	$	!	'!#			#	
Much of the material presented here relates to changes in a series of transport intensity 
indicators over time, or at one point in time. There are other changes taking place within 
economies that are likely to have an impact on efficiency dimension of travel, perhaps 
reducing or increasing transport intensity. Included here are dematerialisation, new 
production processes (e.g. flexible specialisation), customer driven networks and 
globalisation. These will all influence transport intensity in the freight sector and some of the 
important ideas are briefly outlined here. 
Dematerialisation can make a more fundamental impact on transport intensity. However, 
although the material intensity of products may decrease, material consumption can still 
increase as the economy grows and demand expands. According to one estimate, 
dematerialisation could result in a 15-20 percent reduction in freight volumes in the period 
between 1995-2020 (Schleicher-Tappeser et al, 1998). Further reductions could be achieved 
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through raising the durability of products so that they last longer but here there is a trade off 
between lasting quality and the need to take advantage of technological innovations. 
Another significant impact on transport intensity might be made as a result of a move from 
global to ‘glocal’6 production. Traditional arguments strongly favour concentration of 
production to take advantage of agglomeration economies. However, the development of 
flexible specialisation has created a new ‘complementarity’ between global networks and 
regional production for regional markets in which products are locally sourced (see for 
example Piore and Sabel, 1984). Production units are small-scale so that the new lean 
production methods can be introduced. For example, in the state of Baden-Wurttemberg in 
south Germany, most suppliers of the Mercedes car manufacturing plant are based in and 
around Stuttgart. Many components are sourced within a radius of 100 kilometres from the 
plant and are ordered virtually to the hour (Schleicher-Tappeser et al, 1998). Local production 
networks provide the opportunity for short travel distances and a reduction in freight traffic. 
However, such just-in-time sourcing can of course also mean more journeys. The potential 
reduction in freight traffic through the use of regional markets, regional production, and the 
reduction in international flow of goods (that have been produced for local markets) could 
amount to between 20-30 per cent over a period of 25 years (Schleicher-Tappeser et al, 1998). 
There is substantial potential for decoupling in the freight sector as a result of new forms of 
production. The economy of scale arguments, together with economies related to 
specialisation and the comparative cost advantages of producing large quantities for large 
markets, are now being questioned. Customer-driven requirements mean that products are 
now tailored to individual specifications so that smaller scale production for regional markets 
become possible, provided that the knowledge and skills are available. 
However, there is still a long way to go as global cultures and internationalisation have been 
instrumental in producing similar values, tastes and lifestyles, with the consequent loss of 
community and locality. Similarly, most changes in policy have tended to encourage greater 
internationalisation through trade liberalisation, market based strategies, subsidies to farmers 
and other groups, deregulation in transport, privatisation, and even markets for environmental 
and consumer protection. Boundaries are no longer drawn to coincide with national frontiers, 
but they are much wider, and any true investigation of transport intensity should recognise 
this. This is in part related to the ‘leakage’ issue, as the environmental costs may well be 
incurred in a different location (or country or even continent) to where consumption takes 
place. The most optimistic view is that in the freight sector, transport demand could remain 
constant over the next 20 years (to 2020), with the strong implementation of decoupling 
strategies. 
In the passenger sector, the opportunities for stabilisation in demand seem harder to envisage, 
particularly within the context of increased affluence and leisure time. Decoupling must again 
be seen as a combination of strategies to reduce the volume of traffic, the distance travelled 
and measures to increase efficiency, but at the same time maintaining economic growth. The 
decoupling arguments follow the same structure as in the freight sector with dematerialisation 
of travel through less travel or travel by more efficient modes, and through establishing local 
travel patterns through the reorganisation of the production and consumption patterns based 
on local and regional networks (Banister et al, 2000). 
                                                 
6
. Glocal refers to a combination of global and local, where production is still controlled by large multinational 
companies, but produced locally for local markets under franchising and other arrangements. 
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6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
In the context of this paper, the important conclusion is, even if there has in the past been a 
link between transport use and economic growth, there is no reason why this link should 
continue. In order to reduce transport intensity, policy should be focused on maintaining 
levels of economic growth broadly defined, but at the same time reducing levels of transport 
growth. This relationship should perhaps not be limited to a simple ratio of transport growth 
to GDP growth as this will inevitably demonstrate a decoupling effect, both in terms of 
forecasts and assumptions used and in terms of actual change. There should be a much 
greater level of research on the nature of the measures to be used – primary energy 
consumption and carbon emissions are two possibilities for the key transport indicators – and 
whether GDP is the most appropriate or only measure available to reflect the real changes 
that are taking place in the economy. 
The presentation of targets and indicators is also important. From an environmental 
perspective, transport and/or energy consumption/emissions need to be reduced relative to 
economic growth not only in a relative sense but also in absolute terms. The Kyoto Protocol 
makes a commitment to absolute levels of reduction, but most of the debate is about relative 
change. As a corollary to this, it is probably easier in the transport sector to achieve an 
absolute reduction in energy and emissions, rather than an absolute reduction in transport 
volume. This requires measures that combine transport change with environmental factors 
such as energy consumption and pollution emissions. It is also clear that tackling transport 
demand does not just require transport policies – decisions in many other sectors affect the 
demand for transport and these other sectors need to be addressed as well if decoupling is to 
occur (see also Stead and Banister, 2001). 
Changes in society and the economy can have some potentially significant effects on 
decoupling. Shifts in products and production processes, for example, can give rise to 
opportunities for dematerialisation and consequently for decoupling. Changes in technology 
may also have some significant effects on travel demand in terms of both passenger and 
freight transport (see for example Golob and Regan, 2001) and hence on decoupling. There is 
also the possibility of ‘leapfrogging’ where countries can jump technologies to take 
advantage of the newer and cheaper infrastructure. This is particularly true of the satellite 
technology that is now available. There are a number of ways in which decoupling may occur 
but what has not yet been established is the relative potential for each to contribute to 
decoupling: more research is needed here. 
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